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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to observe how supreme courts use their discretionary power over
their dockets to correct appellate courts’ decisions relative to their own interpretation of the
law. There are two supreme courts in France, the Conseil d’État for the administrative branch,
and the Cour de Cassation for the civil one. In both courts, at different dates though, a reform
took place that gave them discretionary control over their dockets. Hence, a difference in
the supreme courts’ decisions might be due to either different correction activities, selection
strategies, or both. Accordingly, it is necessary to distinguish between them before drawing
any conclusions about supreme courts’ behaviors. We develop an econometric approach to
assess whether the correction activities are similar between supreme courts, and whether
these activities are affected when the supreme courts can select cases. Using an original
database of all environmental cases determined by the supreme courts between 1956 and
2010, we rely on a counterfactual approach to compare cases across the courts before and
after the reforms. Our study concludes that correction activities do not differ across the
courts as long as they are submitted to the same selection rule. We also find that the supreme
courts use the possibility of selection to increase their pro-plaintiff correction activities in a
way that affects the overall probability of success of plaintiffs and defendants.
JEL classification: K32, K41
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1 Introduction
One justification for the existence of supreme courts is the need to harmonize the way in which
the judicial system applies the law. The disparity of legal decisions within a single legal frame-
work can be perceived as a threat to equality before the law: litigants should expect to face
the same application of the rules independently of the judge before whom they appear at trial.
In this regard, the hierarchical structure of the judiciary, dominated by supreme courts, can be
considered an appropriate solution: litigants can challenge the decisions of appellate courts.
Supreme courts’ judges use this appeal process to reverse (resp. uphold) appellate court deci-
sions they consider inappropriate (resp. appropriate). Supreme courts therefore have the op-
portunity to correct decisions of appellate courts due to improper application of the law, to
clarify unclear legal issues, and, sometimes, to limit judicial activism. Although non-legal fac-
tors may affect the decision-making of supreme courts, this final appeal to a single court greatly
contributes to aligning case-law on a single interpretation of legal rules. The main role of the
supreme courts is thus to align the appellate courts’ application of legal rules on theirs, or, in
other words, to correct the appellate courts’ decisions to fit their own interpretation of legal rules.
Although supreme courts contribute to harmonizing the legal framework, they are not exempt
from political and/or judicial bias. Several works have shown that justices of the supreme courts
may indeed be motivated by non-legal factors such as ideological preferences or political pres-
sure; they may also be influenced by peer biases. In this respect, supreme courts may take
advantage of the opportunity to overrule appellate courts’ decisions so as to align case law with
their own preferences: supreme courts might correct appellate courts’ biases relative to their
own.
The aim of this paper is to observe how supreme courts use this discretionary power in the
French context. In the French legal system, due to their different backgrounds, civil and adminis-
trative judges from lower courts may have different biases that may influence their decisions, es-
pecially their severity towards defendants (State, state representatives and state-own companies
for administrative courts vs private companies and individuals for civil courts). Consequently,
administrative and civil supreme courts’ judges may choose different selection strategies accord-
ing to their perceptions of those biases. Hence, observing their selection strategies could shed
light on how judges from both supreme courts perceive the decisions and the biases of lower
courts’ judges from their own jurisdiction (administrative vs civil). In other words, different se-
lection strategies in civil and administrative supreme courts would reveal that supreme courts’
judges from one jurisdiction are more concerned with potentially biased decisions from lower
courts’ decisions than supreme courts’ judges from the other jurisdiction. Moreover, this would
reveal that the interpretation of legal rules by appellate judges and supreme court’s judges differ
more in one jurisdiction than in the other.
To explore the correction activities of the supreme courts, we evaluate 614 supreme civil and
administrative courts’ decisions in the field of environmental accidents from 1956 to 2010, and
test for a difference in treatment between the two courts. We run Probit estimations to assess the
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impact of the supreme courts on defendants’ win rates. Following Shavell (1995), we assume that
the supreme courts can engage in correction activities with respect to appellate courts’ errors and
biases, especially if the former have a discretionary control over their dockets and can focus on
potentially biased decisions from appellate courts (Eisenberg et al. (2012)). Hence, the greater
the discrepancy between the appellate courts’ and the supreme courts’ preferences, the more
the latter are expected to engage in correction activities and, therefore, to reverse the appellate
courts’ decisions.
Previous studies of supreme courts’ decisions have emphasized the importance of considering
case selection (Kastellec and Lax (2008)).1 Indeed, the case selection process, whereby supreme
courts can choose the cases they hear, leads to biased observed samples. As case selection strate-
gies are not usually publicized, any inference from case outcomes is potentially flawed. In our
study, selection bias is a major issue as the two supreme courts have both been allowed to se-
lect their cases, though at different dates. It is therefore very likely that the correction activities
of the supreme courts (vis-à-vis appellate courts) may be affected by the selection mechanisms:
supreme courts that hold very different beliefs from their appellate courts may use selection
mechanisms to focus more intensively on reversal decisions. Indeed, a difference between the
two supreme courts’ decisions might be due to different correction activities vis-à-vis appellate
courts or to different case selection strategies, or both. Consequently, it is necessary to distin-
guish the impact of each “bias” (correction and selection) before drawing any conclusion.
Our investigation consists in two steps. First, we compare the correction behavior of both
supreme courts. This first part seeks to figure out whether the Conseil d’État (supreme adminis-
trative tribunal) engages in more correction activities of the appellate courts’ decisions than the
Cour de Cassation (supreme civil court). This allows us to indirectly assess the relative distance
in the courts’ preferences between the appellate and their respective supreme levels. Second, we
go a step further by quantifying how case selection affects the correction activity of the highest
instances: we investigate whether the supreme courts, when they are allowed to select cases,
change their correction activities vis-à-vis the appellate courts’ decisions.
The paper shows that, over the entire period, the Conseil d’État engages in more correction ac-
tivities than the Cour de Cassation. However, decomposing the whole period according to the
selection capacity of each court, we find that the supreme courts’ correction activities are similar
in their intensity when both courts share the same selection mechanism.In other words, observed
differences in correction activities are only due to the fact that one supreme court could select
its dockets before the other but not to the fact that one supreme court tend to engage in more
correction that the other.
1Selection biases have different sources which can go back to the origins of a case. It is generally admitted that
the set of trials which take place in a lower court is not necessarily representative of the whole set of potential trials.
Some case categories can be favored by the plaintiffs if they feel they have more chances of success. Even the set
of plaintiffs (and thus of parties) may not be fully representative of the set of potential plaintiffs (and parties): the
decision to sue can depend on the nature of the plaintiff (an individual, a firm), the level of education, the knowledge
of the legal system and the level of wealth. Biases can be created at the origin of a trial, and propagate throughout the
appeal processes up to the supreme courts’ level: in theory, some biases can be created at each stage due to factors
affecting the decision of appellants to file the case.
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The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.
Section 3 depicts the legal background whereas Section 4 describes the data and presents some
statistics and preliminary econometric results. Section 5 develops our econometric strategy to
assess the correction activities of each supreme court over time. Section 6 concludes.
2 Prior literature
Two strands of literature relate to our paper. A first body of works has investigated whether
judges’ characteristics and their environment impact their decisions. We refer to this literature
as the study of judges’ biases. A second set of papers is dedicated to the methodology and the
biases relative to the empirical study of case outcomes and courts’ decisions. We refer to this
literature as the study of selection biases.
Over the last decades, judges’ biases have been abundantly studied. Indeed, some authors have
investigated the effects of gender (Choi et al. (2011), Greiner and Rubin (2011), Bogoch and Don-
Yechiya (1999)), religion (Bornstein and K. (2009), Gazal-Ayal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2010)), race
(Shayo and Zussman (2011)), or judges’ political preferences (Choi and Gulati (2008), Lambert-
Mogiliansky et al. (2006), Ashenfelter et al. (1995), Hall (2010), Amaral-Garcia et al. (2009),
Franck (2009), Martin et al. (2005), Spiller and Gely (1992), Espinosa (2015, 2017), Desrieux and
Espinosa (2015)) on case outcomes. Others have studied the impact of the socio-economic en-
vironment on judges’ decisions. For instance, Berger and Neugart (2011) report a positive link
between the legal activity of German labour courts and unemployment. Ichino et al. (2003) ob-
serve that Italian labor courts are more favorable to employees when unemployment is high, a
phenomenon also reported by Malo et al. (2016) from Spanish labor courts, whereas Marinescu
(2003, 2011) concludes the opposite effect for the French and British labor courts respectively.
A second comprehensive stream of research has dealt with unequal treatment resulting from the
composition of the courts or from the identity of the parties themselves. Clermont and Eisenberg
(1992) show that plaintiffs’ success rates differ significantly before judges and juries, since attor-
neys select more difficult cases when pleading before juries. Two other papers, Clermont and
Eisenberg (2001), Clermont and Eisenberg (2002) show that defendants succeed more than plain-
tiffs on appeal from civil trials, explaining this phenomenon by appellate judges’ attitudes. This
difference has also been reported by Eisenberg (2004) and Eisenberg and Heise (2009). However,
the fact that plaintiffs tend to appeal cases even when their chances of success are very slight
might also explain the apparent pro-defendant bias (Eisenberg and Farber (2003), Eisenberg
and Farber (2013)). Eisenberg et al. (2011) confirm this last point by showing that there are no
asymmetric reversal rates favoring defendants in Israel’s supreme court’s appellate cases. In the
closest paper to ours, Amaral-Garcia and Garoupa (2012) test for a pro-government bias in ad-
ministrative tribunals in the field of medical malpractice in Spain. Studying the supreme court’s
decisions to compare civil and administrative appellate courts’ adjudications, they conclude that
there is no evidence of such a pro-government bias in administrative tribunals.
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Notwithstanding the progresses accomplished in the quantitative analysis of courts’ decisions
and judges’ preferences, most of the authors fail to take into account biases that result from case
selection.2 Indeed, investigations of courts’ decisions might be flawed by several biases. First,
a great proportion of cases are settled: consequently, inferences about courts’ decisions might
under- or overestimate the impact of the exogenous variables if they also affect the settlement
decision (Priest and Klein (1984), Eisenberg (1990)). In the same vein, decisions to appeal are not
random and, therefore, case outcomes in appellate courts do not necessarily reveal the actual
severity -and potential biases- of lower courts’ judges. In other words, selection biases limit the
possibility of inferring general conclusions about judges’ decisions and preferences from stud-
ies of case outcomes, especially if the focus is exclusively on the identity of the winning party
(Clermont and Eisenberg (1998)). Another substantial selection bias arises when only a fraction
of the whole caseload is published (Donohue and Siegelman (1990), Merritt and Brudney (2001),
Law (2005)) as the choice to publish a decision may not be random.
Finally, the study of supreme courts’ decisions is even more sensitive to selection biases: supreme
courts focus on the most complex cases (Kritzer and Richards (2002)), which are not represen-
tative of the whole set of cases adjudicated by appellate courts (Cross (1997), Friedman (2006)).
The reason for such selection biases is twofold. First, as for appellate courts, appeals to supreme
courts are costly and not random. Second, most supreme courts have some discretionary control
over their dockets and, therefore, can select the cases they review without having to explain their
selection strategy.3 Hence, it is fundamental to cope with discretionary case selection before in-
ferring general conclusions about supreme courts’ preferences and potential biases (Harvey and
Friedman (2009), Eisenberg et al. (2012), Eisenberg et al. (2014)) from the study of their case out-
comes, as supreme courts’ selection biases may substantially impact observed statistical results
(Kastellec and Lax (2008)).
Although a growing number of scholars recognize the importance of case selection and develop
different statistical methods to control for it,4 the impact of selection bias on correction activities
has almost never been assessed. More importantly, no study, to our knowledge, analyzes how
correction activities are affected by case selection rules. This is the gap we aim to fill.
2For instance, concerning the analysis of labor courts, Macis (2001) and Marinescu (2003) ignore out-of-court set-
tlements and work with a sample biased by case selection since the choice to settle is not random. In the same vein,
in their study of judges’ ideology and its impact on case outcomes, Sunstein et al. (2006) only focus on published
decisions. However, Keele et al. (2009) show that the choice to publish a decision is not random and therefore sam-
ples restricted to published cases are biased. Finally, some authors do not even mention the existence of sample and
selection biases (e.g. Epstein and Martin (2010), Amaral-Garcia and Garoupa (2012)).
3See for instance Eisenberg et al. (2011), Eisenberg et al. (2012), Eisenberg et al. (2014), and Eisenberg and Huang
(2012).
4For instance, Eisenberg and Huang (2012) use a reform of Taiwan’s supreme court allowing for discretionary
selection of cases as a quasi-natural experiment to observe judges’ selection strategies. Eisenberg et al. (2014) compare
discretionary and mandatory jurisdictions in Israel’s supreme court to assess case selection. Hall (2010) uses random
judicial assignment to control for selection biases when assessing the effect of appellate judges’ partisanship on their
decisions. Eisenberg et al. (2012) use key covariates to account for non-random aspects of case assignment. Finally, in
a recent paper, Boyd et al. (2010) use a more sophisticated method based on propensity score matching to deal with
non-random assignment of cases among male and female judges.
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3 The French legal background: A quasi experiment for identifying
selection biases
3.1 The French legislation: Two separate jurisdictions
In France, as in many civil law countries, cases involving the state as litigant are dealt with
by separate courts. Indeed, disputes between private parties only are dealt with by civil juris-
dictions, whereas cases involving the state are determined by administrative tribunals. More
precisely, in environmental cases, a dispute will be tried in the administrative tribunals if the
defendant is a public legal person, a state-owned company, or a private company entitled to
provide public services and exercising administrative authority.5 Absent this administrative au-
thority, a private company providing public services will be sued in the civil courts.6 Hence, en-
vironmental administrative litigation may concern either a controversy over a decision of a state
official (e.g. authorization to start a potentially environmentally unfriendly activity, implemen-
tation of a controversial local regulation, or stringency of an environmental impact assessment),
or a dispute over an action of a public defendant that resulted in damages to private plaintiffs.
The main reason for such a distinction between private and public defendants is that "public
authorities have specific powers and obligations that require that their action should not be
reviewed by ordinary courts” (Frydman (2008)).
Consequently, liability is determined differently in administrative and civil courts. In Civil Law,
fault-based liability is the rule (except for the most environmentally unfriendly facilities called
ICPE facilities,7 which are subject to strict liability) and the criterion for negligence is the “rea-
sonable man standard” (bon père de famille). In Administrative Law, the standard of care is much
higher as state-owned companies and state officials have a duty to ensure health and safety,8
and cannot claim that their level of care was limited by a budget constraint.9 Furthermore,
the procedures are also different. The procedure before administrative tribunals is inquisitorial
(inquisitoire) whereas the civil procedure is accusatorial (accusatoire). This means that adminis-
trative tribunals direct the course of the procedure and are in charge of finding out the facts that
may be relevant to their decisions (Frydman, 2008).10 Consequently, administrative judges have
5Private companies with a public service mission are subject to Administrative Law if they are entitled to take
administrative decisions, i.e. they benefit from a “prérogative de puissance publique” (see Arrêt Magnier in CE 13
January 1961, and CE 15 May 1991, Association Girondins de Bordeaux FC).
6Tribunal des Conflits, 27 November 1995, Le Troedec, and Arrêt Temier in CE 6 February 1903.
7Installations classées pour la protection de l’environnement.
8The first reference to this obligation appeared in 1902 (Law of 15 February 1902, relative to the protection of public
health). The criterion became more stringent over the century as many public health and environmental scandals
occurred. For instance, the State was found responsible for "public health deficiencies” in the HIV-contaminated
blood affair (CE 9 April 1992, n.138653) and in the asbestos affair (CE 3 March 2004, n.241153). For a detailed analysis
of the evolution of the severity of the precautionary principle in French environmental law, see Bentata and Faure
(2012).
9Cass. Crim., 2 July 1998, n.97-83.286.
10These differences between Administrative and Civil Law in the severity of the rules but also in the procedures
renders the analysis quite uneasy, even with some control over a number of observable variables. For this reason, we
do not give any definite conclusion in the end of Section 4, with the first regressions. Section 5 refines the analysis by
5
more leeway than civil judges in taking their decisions.
3.2 The appeal process: A common feature
Despite their different rules, civil and administrative courts are organized along similar lines.
Both are pyramidal with the Cour de Cassation and the Conseil d’État at the apex of the civil
and the administrative branches, respectively. Civil and administrative cases are first tried in
Cours d’Instance and in Cours Administratives d’Instance respectively, and can be appealed in Cours
d’Appel and in Cours Administratives d’Appel. As far as litigation is concerned,11 the Cour de
Cassation and the Conseil d’État share a common feature: both have to harmonize case law to
ensure that texts are interpreted in the same way nationwide.12 Moreover, they do not rule on
the merits of a case, but rather on the proper application of the rules by the appellate courts
(i.e. both supreme courts rule on the decisions of the appellate courts). Hence, even though
administrative and civil rules might differ, the task of judges from both supreme courts is similar.
From this common role, it follows that it is meaningful to compare decisions of both supreme
courts to the extent that cases are comparable. Controlling for the characteristics of the case, a
difference in severity between the two supreme courts could indicate heterogeneous correction
behaviors: supreme court judges may seek to correct some systematic mistakes of the appellate
courts, though with different intensities.
3.3 The potential for a pro-defendant bias in administrative tribunals
In France, Administrative and Civil Law are considered quite separate branches of law, with
their own logic and their own procedures. For this reason, administrative and civil judges often
come from very different backgrounds. Civil judges (referred to as Magistrats) enjoy special
statutory protection. To become civil judges, candidates have to attend the National School
for the Judiciary (École Nationale de la Magistrature) for a period of 31 months. There are three
different competitive examinations depending on the professional experience of the candidate:
the first one is open to students with a Master degree in Law who are at least 27 years of age.
The second and third ones are open to candidates who already have at least seven years’ legal
experience. Most civil judges come from the first examination process.13 As a result, the majority
of successful candidates begin their professional careers as civil judges, and most of them remain
civil judges until retirement.
The picture for the administrative branch is more complex. First of all, administrative judges
are usually civil servants and not Magistrats. In this regard, they do not benefit from protections
providing some control over unobservable variables.
11Indeed, the Conseil d’État exercises two different roles: it is not only the supreme court of the administrative
jurisdiction but also the most important legal advisor to the Government.
12See About the Court, Cour de Cassation, www.courdecassation.fr/about_the_court_9256.html.
13For instance, in 2006, 88% of newly graduated judges entered the National School for the Judiciary through the
first examination process. See the statistics provided by the Cour de Cassation on its website:
http://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/File/pdf_2007/10-05-2007/10-05-2007_mcKee_fr.pdf.
6
that guarantee the independence of Magistrats from the State. Second, except for judges from
the Conseil d’État who, for the majority, attended the National School of Administration (École
Nationale d’Administration) after a highly competitive examination, administrative judges are re-
cruited from among civil servants, lawyers, and high-flying law graduates. This phenomenon is
explained by the relatively low number of students who intend to become administrative judges
and the growing shortage of administrative judges in recent decades. As a matter of fact, over
the last decade, only 19% of the new administrative judges had not been civil servants.14 This
means that 81% of the new administrative judges used to work in close relationship with state
officials and local authorities, i.e. precisely the parties they may have to judge once in charge.
This situation is favorable to the emergence of sympathy towards a group (the group of public
agents) to which administrative judges previously belonged. Such a context can potentially give
rise to a pro-defendant bias.15
Unlike lower administrative tribunals, judges sitting in the Conseil d’État mainly come from a
specialized school. Each year, five positions as auditors (Auditeurs) are made available to the top
graduates of the National School of Administration. After four years, an auditor is promoted to
master of petitions (Maître des requêtes) and, after twelve years, to the level of judge (Conseiller
d’État). Promotion is based exclusively on seniority which ensures independence and impartial-
ity in the promotion of members. Recruitment by external appointment accounts for one out of
four masters of petitions and for one out of three judges. A number of external appointments,
upon the nomination of the Vice-President of the Conseil d’État, is reserved for members of the
administrative tribunals and the administrative appellate tribunals.16 Similarly to the lower ad-
ministrative tribunals, one could question the impartiality of these judges towards the State.
Judges who were appointed from the lower courts potentially suffer from the same pro-State
biases. Moreover, judges from the National School of Administration might also be biased to-
wards the State: their choice to devote their career to the public administration might reflect
preferences favorable to the State.
3.4 The potential for a selection bias in both supreme courts
Like most of the supreme courts in other countries, the Cour de Cassation and Conseil d’État have
some control over the cases filed that allow them to select the ones that will actually be heard.17
Considering this discretionary control, any econometric results about courts’ decisions should
be interpreted carefully. Indeed, judges’ decisions can change as time passes, either because
of external circumstances, or because selected cases have themselves changed. In the present
study, the comparison of judgments by both courts can be distorted when they do not select
similar cases. If both courts do not select cases in the same way, then a comparison of final
14See the statistics provided by the Cour de Cassation on its website:
http://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/File/pdf_2007/10-05-2007/10-05-2007_recrutement_adm.pdf.
15Figure 2 in Appendix B provides a description of the French legal framework regarding the different courts
16See the website of the Conseil d’État: http://english.conseil-etat.fr/.
17See Eisenberg et al. (2011). In France, 30% of the cases filed are declared "non-eligible" and rejected without
publication of the underlying reasons in the legal databases.
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decisions will prevent us from determining whether one court is more severe than the other
against defendants, or whether the initial selection was different. In other words, the possibility
of selecting the cases to be reviewed increases the confusion between judges’ preferences and
selection bias.
For this reason, selection bias is often ignored or simply alluded to in empirical works analyz-
ing supreme courts’ decisions. However, the French situation is particularly interesting in this
respect, since reforms of case eligibility criteria allow us to distinguish - at least partly - different
biases. Indeed, the abolition of the filter designated as Chambre des Requêtes in 1947 forced the
Cour de Cassation to motivate its decisions whether or not to review the cases filed. This cum-
bersome process has increased the workload of the court causing further delays for judgment.
For this reason, the organic law of 25 June 200118 has restored the preliminary screening of files,
allowing a case to be declared non-eligible without having to provide any detailed motivation
for this rejection.19 This law came into force on 1 January 2002.20 Hence, for the period 1947 to
2001, the Cour de Cassation could not select the cases to be heard.21 The selection bias - at the
Cour de Cassation’s level - can only concern cases after 2001.22
A similar reform occurred for the Conseil d’État for which the preliminary screening of the cases
was restored on 1 January 1989.23 Hence, cases judged before 1989 constitute a complete and
unbiased sample of the cases adjudicated by the Conseil d’État. Only cases judged since 1989 can
present the selection bias we identify.
4 Database
In order to investigate the correction behavior of the supreme courts together with the potential
selection effects induced by the reforms, we study the entire set of decisions of the Cour de Cas-
sation and the Conseil d’État concerning environmental accidents and damage between 1956 and
2010. Our database is compiled from two French official legal search engines that list all cases
before the Cour de Cassation and the Conseil d’État since 1956.24 To collect the entire set of environ-
mental cases, we used the keywords: pollution, trouble de voisinage (nuisance to neighborhood),
18Loi 2001-539 révisant l’Art. L 131-6 du Code de l’Organisation Judiciaire.
19See http://www.courdecassation.fr/cour_cassation_1/autres_publications_discours_2039/publications_2201/
admission_pourvois_cassation_8424.html.
20Art.28, Loi 2001-539.
21From a practical viewpoint, this means that legal databases collecting all the decisions taken in the Cour de Cassa-
tion do not present any selection bias - at the court’s level - for this period. Appeals have been judged unacceptable
or not motivated by serious reasons: in any event, the decision has been motivated by the court and codified in the
databases.
22The selection bias that we manage to isolate in this paper is the one that occurs from the choice of cases to be
heard by the supreme courts. This selection bias is potentially important, as explained earlier, but it is not the only
possible one. Our approach allows us to isolate and quantify this selection bias, but not the ones that take place
earlier in the history of a particular case, i.e. before the appeal at the supreme court’s level.
23Art.16, Loi 87-1127 du 31 décembre 1987.
24We have voluntarily excluded criminal cases, which are too different to be compared with civil and administra-
tive cases. Indeed, once a case goes to the criminal courts in France, then it will not be examined in the civil courts.
This can be different from countries where a same case can go both to criminal and civil courts.
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environmental damage, environmental risk, environmental loss, ecological risk, ecological loss,
ICPE,25 Seveso, IPPC,26 and risk prevention. We obtained a total of 614 different cases, among
which one fourth originated from the Conseil d’État.27
In the following subsections, we present the variables of interest and a set of control variables.
All variables are dummy variables encoded “1” when present in cases and “0” otherwise.
The dependent variable is the decision of the court (“pro-defendant decisions”, designated as
Prodef ), equal to 1 when judges rule in favor of the defendant and 0 otherwise. This variable
measures the defendants’ chances of success.
Among the explanatory variables, the identity of the court is the main variable of interest. It is
designated as CE, and takes value 1 if the case is judged by the Conseil d’État and 0 if litigated
by the Cour de Cassation. The econometric analysis relies heavily on this variable in order to
determine whether the court’s identity influences the outcome of the appeal, and thus, whether
the correction behavior differs between the courts.
In order to take into account the specificity of each case, we use various control variables. The
most important is the identity of the petitioner, designated as Defappeal, taking value 1 if the
defendant filed the appeal before the supreme court and 0 if the victim did so.28 From a statis-
tical viewpoint, this variable coefficient measures the judges’ tendency to satisfy the party who
files the appeal, whoever the party is.29 This variable provides some control over the “confirma-
tive/validating” versus “invalidating” behavior of the court. This variable has to be taken into
consideration. Indeed, in our database, 63.52% of the cases are filed by defendants and 36.48%
by plaintiffs. An “invalidating” behavior will have a significant positive effect on the variable
Prodef, whereas a “confirmative” behavior will have a significant negative effect on Prodef.
Environmental lawsuits may be brought for different reasons. Legal grounds describe the le-
gal basis used by the petitioner to get her case to the Cour de Cassation or the Conseil d’État. In
our database, we observe five different and recurrent legal grounds invoked by the petition-
ers: disagreement as to the amount of compensation (which we take as our reference variable),
disagreement as to the relevance of the proof of wrongful or negligent behavior (Proof ), dis-
agreement with the appellate court’s treatment of causation (Causality), disagreement with the
appellate court’s treatment of uncertainty about the consequences - in the case of a lawsuit pri-
marily brought by potential victims claiming that a given activity imposes an imminent risk of
25Environmentally protected installations (Installations classées pour la protection de l’environnement).
26For Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control. See European Directive EC 96/61 imposing the application of the
“Best Available Technology" principle to polluting facilities.
27We have 473 decisions of the Cour de Cassation the and 141 of the Conseil d’État.
28In our database, there is only one appellant for each case.
29Indeed, the coefficient of the variable Defappeal measures the probability Pr(Pro-defendant|Defendant appeal),
which is the probability that Prodef takes value 1 when Defappeal changes from 0 to 1. Defappeal takes value 1 when
the defendant files the appeal and 0 when it is the plaintiff, and Prodef takes value 1 when the defendant wins and
0 when the plaintiff wins. Hence, observing the chances that the Prodef equals 1 when Defappeal changes from 0 to
1 is equivalent to measuring the chances that Prodef equals 0 when Defappeal changes from 1 to 0. This amounts to
observing the probability Pr(Pro-plaintiff|Plaintiff appeal), meaning the probability of having a pro-plaintiff decision
when the plaintiff appeals. To be fully convinced: Pr(Prodef = 1|Defappeal = 1)− Pr(Prodef = 1|Defappeal =
0) = [1−Pr(Prodef = 0|Defappeal = 1)]− [1−Pr(Prodef = 0|Defappeal = 0)] = Pr(Prodef = 0|Defappeal =
0)− Pr(Prodef = 0|Defappeal = 1).
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accident - (Uncertainty), and disagreement as to the due process of law, or as to the legal proce-
dure followed by the appellate court (Procedure).
Environmental lawsuits may also concern different natural assets. Another group of control
variables identifies the type of natural resource affected: Water, Soil, Air, Sea, or Noise.
Lastly, a variable takes into account the fact that the defendant had complied with the regula-
tion at the date of accident: Compliance with the regulation is a dummy variable, noted 1 if the
defendant complied with the regulation and 0 otherwise.30
5 Pro-plaintiff correction activities and case selection
The empirical goal is twofold. First, we seek to determine whether the two supreme courts en-
gage in the same level of correction activities. Second, we investigate the impact of case selection
on these correction activities.
5.1 Bias correction activities by supreme courts
As stated in Section 2, the main objective of supreme courts is to ensure that legal provisions
are enforced in the same way nationwide. Standard literature in Law and Economics usually
refers to two kinds of mistakes judges can make when deciding a case. Type 1 errors correspond
to cases where an innocent party is wrongfully convicted, whereas Type 2 errors refer to cases
in which a guilty party gets away with it. As both kinds of errors are almost inevitable, the
trade-off between the two types of errors is usually determined by the preferences of the court.
These preferences can be expressed on a single dimension, i.e. a pro-defendant dimension. A
pro-defendant court is less likely to convict a defendant when the evidence is mixed.
In the following analysis, we propose to consider the relative pro-defendant preferences of the
appellate and supreme courts. We denote γ the pro-defendant bias, with γ ∈ (−∞,+∞). A
higher γ represents a stronger pro-defendant bias. Here, we understand the notion of bias in a
very broad sense: it corresponds to the overall propensity of a court to decide in favor of the
defendant when a case is unclear. We write γ1,C the average bias of the appellate courts in the
civil jurisdictions, γ2,C the bias of the Cour de Cassation (i.e. the supreme civil court), γ1,A the
average bias of the administrative appellate tribunals, and γ2,A the bias of the Conseil d’État (i.e.
the supreme administrative tribunal).
The correction activities of each supreme court correspond to the decisions it takes to correct for
the relative bias of the appellate courts. The differences in biases between the appellate and the
supreme courts are given by:
∆k = γ1,k − γ2,k (1)
30For a detailed description of each variable, see Bentata (2013a), Bentata (2013b).
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where k ∈ {A,C}. The correction activities of the supreme courts in favor of the plaintiff are
given by h(∆k), where h(.) is an increasing and monotonous function, and equal to zero at the
origin. A positive ∆k reflects a greater bias toward the defendant of the appellate court than
the supreme court’s bias. A positive ∆k is therefore associated with more correction activities
in favor of the plaintiff, i.e. positive values of h(∆k). Because supreme courts have been able to
select cases at different dates, we introduce a conditional level of correction activity h(∆k|Sk) for
a given selection rule Sk. A score Sk = 0 indicates that supreme court k has no control over its
dockets, while Sk = 1 reflects the fact that it can select cases.
Although our data do not allow us to locate each β1,k or β2,k on a pro-defendant axis, our em-
pirical strategy aims at comparing the correction activities of the two courts. Three cases can
emerge:
• Case 1. h(∆C |SA = SC) > h(∆A|SA = SC): The Cour de Cassation engages in more pro-
plaintiff correction activity than the Conseil d’État.
• Case 2. h(∆C |SA = SC) = h(∆A|SA = SC): supreme courts engage in similar levels of
pro-plaintiff correction.
• Case 3. h(∆C |SA = SC) < h(∆A|SA = SC): The Cour de Cassation engages in less pro-
plaintiff correction activity than the Conseil d’État.
5.2 Econometrics
This subsection aims at testing the relative levels of correction activities depicted above. The
goal is to determine whether courts engage in different levels of pro-plaintiff correction. To do
so, we propose to run a Probit model to estimate the probability of a case being determined in
the supreme court in favor of the plaintiff. The latent utility model we consider is written:
Prodef ∗i = β0 + β1CEi + β2Xi + ui, (2)
where Prodef∗ is the latent utility of a pro-defendant decision, CEi is a variable equal to 1 if
case i is ruled by the Conseil d’Etat, Xi is a vector of control variables for the case i, and ui is a
normally distributed random term.
We propose to run the Probit model for four samples. First, we consider the entire set of data,
running from 1956 to 2011. Second, because of the two reforms that introduced the possibility of
case selection by supreme courts, we consider three periods in turn: when neither of the courts
can select cases (1956 - 1989), when only the Conseil d’État is able to select cases (1988 - 2001), and
when both courts are able to select cases (2002 - 2011). Results of these estimations are displayed
in Table 1.31
31Estimations of the coefficients associated to the control variables are displayed in the Appendix.
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The objective of the Probit estimation consists in comparing the level of correction activities of
the two courts. A positive (resp. negative) coefficient associated to CE indicates that the Conseil
d’État engages in less (resp. more) pro-plaintiff correction than the Cour de Cassation: case 1 (resp.
case 3). A coefficient not statistically different from zero depicts a situation in which supreme
courts have the same intensity of pro-plaintiff correction activities.
Table 1: Results of the Probit regressions
Full Period Before 1989 From 1989 to 2001 After 2001 Full Period Full Period
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
Conseil d’État (CE) -0.274* -0.152 -0.720*** -0.312
(0.147) (0.258) (0.272) (0.351)
CE×1t<1989 -0.0595
(0.234)
CE×11989≤t≤2001 -0.725*** -0.724***
(0.268) (0.268)
CE×12001>t -0.193
(0.337)
CE×(1− 11989≤t≤2001) -0.104
(0.191)
Observations 614 168 276 169 614 614
Nagelkerke R2 0.395 0.432 0.466 0.342 0.395 0.395
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 1 yields interesting results. At first sight, the estimation in model 1 suggests that the Con-
seil d’État (supreme administrative tribunal) engages in more pro-plaintiff correction activities
than the Cour de Cassation (supreme civil court). Indeed, the coefficient associated to CE is sta-
tistically different from zero in this regression covering the entire period. Decomposing the data
into three sub-periods yields additional results. First, in model 2, i.e. prior to 1989, when neither
supreme court could select cases, we do not detect any difference in the intensity of the correc-
tion activities of the courts. Second, in model 4, after 2001, when both supreme courts were able
to select cases, we do not detect any difference between their correction activities. Third, one can
note, however, a highly significant difference in the correction activities in model 3, i.e. between
1989 and 2001, when only the Conseil d’État could select cases.
In the appendix, we run two additional regressions, namely models 5 and 6. Running separate
regressions to estimate the marginal impact of the Conseil d’État for each subperiod is the most
intuitive -and the most commonly used- method. However, if one assumes that the control
variables have a similar impact on the decision whatever the period at stake, it is more efficient
to estimate the model on a single sample and to distinguish the marginal effect of the variable of
interest with interaction with dummy variables. Models 5 and 6 confirm the findings of models
2 to 4.32
32With model 6, we investigate whether the marginal effect of CE is different when courts have the same control
possibilities over their dockets and when they have not. We reject this hypothesis with p = 0.060. We believe that the
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Table 2: Marginal Effects of Model 5 from table 1
Variable Marginal Effect P-value Lower Bound Upper Bound
CE×1t<1989 -0.0059 0.953 -0.2018 0.1900
CE×11989≤t≤2001 -0.2839** 0.019 -0.5221 -0.0457
CE×12001>t -0.1081 0.446 -0.3860 0.1698
Finally, we compute the marginal effects associated to model 5 in order to investigate whether
the absence of significance associated to the first (i.e., before 1989) and last periods (i.e., after
2001) result from higher incertitude in the estimation or from a lower estimated effect. Table 2
displays the marginal effect associated with the Conseil d’État for each subperiod. As one can see,
the effect is the strongest (-28.4%) between the two reforms and the lowest before 1989 (-0.6%).
The average marginal effect associated to the Conseil d’État is almost three times lower after the
second reform enters in force (-10.8%). This indicates that the lack of significance after 2001 does
not solely result from the incertitude in the estimation but from the estimated magnitude itself
that is much lower.
The results can be summarized as follows:
• Over the entire period, we observe a stronger commitment of the Conseil d’État than the
Cour de Cassation to correct the pro-defendant bias of the appellate courts.
• This effect is driven by the fact that the Conseil d’État was allowed to select cases earlier,
between 1989 and 2001, and used case selection to increase its pro-plaintiff correction ac-
tivities.
• When both courts were (or when neither court was) allowed to select cases, we do not
detect any difference in their correction activities.
Hence, it appears that although administrative judges have a background that may lead to a
pro-defendant bias, correction activities of both supreme courts are similar, which could be in-
terpreted as follows: there is no difference between administrative and civil supreme courts’
judges’ perception regarding how administrative and civil judges from lower courts interpret
legal rules. In other words, the fact that judges from the Conseil d’Etat do not engage in more
pro-plaintiff correction activity than judges from the Cour de Cassation does not imply that ad-
ministrative judges are not subject to a pro-defendant bias but rather that judges from the Conseil
d’Etat do not perceive a more important pro-defendant bias at lower administrative courts’ level
than judges from the Cour de Cassation at lower civil courts’ level.
In order to evaluate the veracity of these propositions, we propose several additional investiga-
tions. First, to compare the difference in the correction activities between the supreme courts, we
weak significance mainly results from the low number of observations. All in all, these two additional regressions
confirm our main results.
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create counterfactual cases using one court’s decisions to predict the other court’s ones (Subsec-
tion 5.3). Second, we use permutation tests to ensure that the change in the correction activities is
indeed driven by the two reforms and not by actual changes in the supreme courts’ preferences
between 1989 and 2001 (Subsection 5.4).
5.3 Counterfactuals
In order to compare the correction activities of the courts, and thus to confirm or invalidate
the previous results, we propose to adopt a counterfactual approach. The objective consists in
creating cases using one supreme court’s decisions to predict the other supreme court’s ones,
and to capture the discrepancies between the predictions and the observations. To do so, we
rely on matching methods.
The underlying idea of matching estimations is to sort observations from two groups on a sin-
gle axis (the balancing score), such that units with comparable scores from the two groups share
the same observables (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)). The subsequent theoretical and applied
literature has mainly used the propensity score, i.e. the probability of belonging to one group or
another, as a balancing score (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984)). We proceed in the same way and
propose to use a case’s probability of being determined by the Conseil d’État as a balancing score.
We estimate the following equation to compute the balancing score:
CE∗i = α0 + α1Xi + vi (3)
whereXi is the same vector of control variables as in equation (2) and vi is a normally distributed
random term.
We estimate equation (3) for three periods: before 1989, between 1989 and 2000, and after 2001.
We then use matching algorithms to create counterfactuals. We take the cases reviewed by the
Conseil d’État as the reference group, and we use matching algorithms to create, for each case,
counterfactuals that are combinations of the cases dealt with by the Cour de Cassation. We use
four algorithms: the nearest neighbor, the 3-nearest neighbors, the Epanechnikov kernel, and
the Normal kernel.
Table 3 displays the average bias associated with each matching algorithm and the original stan-
dardized bias. As can be seen, the Epanechnikov outperforms the other algorithms and dra-
matically reduces the biases. The Gaussian (or Normal) kernel performs well too, but is slightly
above the 5% threshold for the average standardized bias. We thus build the counterfactuals
based on the Epanechnikov and Gaussian kernels.
For each case i of the Conseil d’État we compute a counterfactual case, i.e. a linear combina-
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Table 3: Matching diagnosis: average standard bias per matching algorithm
Before 1989 From 1989 to 2001 After 2001
Before matching 9.713 19.787 23.459
Nearest Neighbor 10.762 7.724 6.376
3-nearest neighbors 10.93 6.171 6.554
Epanechnikov kernel 3.99 2.463 3.469
Gaussian kernel 4.664 5.208 3.693
tion of the cases of the Cour de Cassation. We then compute the difference between the actual
decision of the Conseil d’État and the probability of a pro-defendant decision predicted by the
counterfactual. If the latter were a correct estimation of the real probability of a pro-defendant
decision, the average difference between the actual and the predicted decisions should be close
to 0. On the contrary, a systematic deviation, i.e. over- or underestimation, would reflect the
higher propensity of one court to rule in favor of one party relative to the other court.
Table 4 reports the average difference between the predicted and actual decisions of the courts
for each of the three periods. It also shows whether these average differences are statistically
different from 0.
Table 4: Average differences between the actual pro-defendant decisions of the Conseil d’État and
the predictions based on the decisions of the Cour de Cassation.
Before 1989 From 1989 to 2001 After 2001
Epanechnikov -.0673 -.1520** -.1073
(-0.86) (-2.24) (-1.06)
Gaussian -.0382 -.1792*** -.0813
(-0.50) (-2.72) (-0.82)
Note: Z-statistics, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
A few conclusions can be drawn from this second set of estimations. First, it confirms that
both courts engage in the same level of pro-plaintiff correction activity when they face the same
selection rule.33 Using the notation introduced in Subsection 5.1, this implies that h(∆C |SC =
SA) = h(∆A|SC = SA). Second, regarding the correction activity of the courts between 1989 and
2001, the estimation concludes that h(∆C |SC,0) < h(∆A|SA,1), indicating that the Conseil d’État
increased its pro-plaintiff correction activity during this time period.
5.4 Change in correction activity or change in preferences?
There are two possible explanations for the previous results. First, they might be supported
by our theory, which claims that courts have increased their correction activity through case
selection. Second, they might alternatively be explained by a change in courts’ preferences over
33According to our results, the introduction of a selection rule decreases by 15.2 to 17.9 percentage points the prob-
ability that the Conseil d’État will rule in favor of the defendant. Yet, the figures have to be taken with caution as they
are derived from a linear probability model.
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time: our data would lead to the same conclusions if the Conseil d’État changed its views in the
1980s, and the Cour de Cassation changed its own in the late 1990s.
In order to investigate this issue, we propose several tests to ensure that our results are indeed
driven by the two specific dates 1989 and 2001. Although we are unable to rule out the possibility
that upper instances changed their preferences at the precise moment when they obtained case
selection, we are willing to exclude the possibility that supreme courts changed their position
steadily over time. To do so, we propose two falsification tests. First, we permute the reform
status in the data. Second, we look at the outcome if we artificially set the reform five years
before or five years after the actual reform.
 Permutation test. The first test deals with the null hypothesis that, in each court, the impact
of the reform on the win rates of defendants (Prodef ) is random. The underlying intuition for
this test is that if the effect of the reform is random, then a random reallocation of the reform
date should have a similar or greater effect on the variable Prodef.
For each court, we create a variable Reform taking value 1 if the case is reviewed after the reform
and 0 otherwise. We observe the effect of the reform on the variable Prodef using an OLS regres-
sion on a period extending from ten years before the reform to ten years after the reform (we
keep all the control variables, as we did for the other regressions). For both courts, the variable
Reform is significant with a negative coefficient (β = −0.163 and p = 0.088 for the Conseil d’État,
β = −0.115 and p = 0.024 for the Cour de Cassation).
We permute the variable Reform: we randomly reallocate the values of the variable Reform in the
sample of interest and observe the effect of this random variable (denoted x on Figure 1) on the
results. We repeat this operation 5000 times and compare the distribution of the coefficients of
the random variable (denoted b in Figure 1) with the coefficient of the variable Reform. Under the
null hypothesis, the coefficient of Reform is regularly found in the distribution (p−value > 0.05):
we cannot reject the assumption that the effect of the reform is simply random.
Figure 1 shows the results of permutations for both courts. We observe that the value of the
coefficient of the variable Reform is always in the extreme 5% of the normal distribution. The
probability of obtaining an identical coefficient at random is p − value = 0.0146 for the Conseil
d’État and p− value = 0.0032 for the Cour de Cassation.
We thus reject H0: the above results are not driven by the random character of the data but by
the reforms.
 Falsification of reform dates. Although the reform has a significant effect on the observed
outcome, we may wonder whether this effect is simply the result of a variation in the severity
of judges over the same period, i.e. a variation in upper instances’ preferences. In order to
ensure that this is not the case, we observe, for each court, the evolution in the severity of judges
starting at a previous or later date with respect to the reform: we measure the effect of a temporal
variable starting five years before then five years after the actual reform on the variable Prodef.
For the Cour de Cassation, we thus measure the effects of two temporal variables, one starting
in 1997 and the other in 2007, and compare the coefficients obtained with those of the variable
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Figure 1: Graphic results for the falsification tests with permutation
Reform. For the Conseil d’État, we do the same with a variable starting in 1984 and the other in
1994. Table 5 provides the results for both courts.
Table 5: Comparison of different time periods over judges’ decisions
Reform Reform minus 5 years Reform plus 5 years
Cassation -0.12*** -0.06 -0.10*
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Conseil d’État -0.14** -0.06 -0.12*
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The set
of control variables used throughout the paper is also used in these regressions. The
falsification tests are conducted separately for each type of courts.
We observe that the temporal variables starting before the reform are non-significant; those start-
ing after the reform have a slightly weaker effect than the reform itself. Hence, for both courts,
the variation in the severity of judges actually starts with the reform. This confirms the above
findings supporting the reform’s effect.
5.5 How do courts select their dockets?
The previous subsections have highlighted the existence of correction activities from both courts,
that induce lower win rates for defendants before these courts. Such a correction activity can
materialize in two ways: either judges select appeals filed by defendants and uphold lower
courts’ decisions, or they select appeals filed by plaintiffs and reverse appellate courts’ decisions.
The two selection modes have different effects on the trial outcome:
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• Scenario 1. With the first strategy, the correction activity has a limited effect on the trial out-
come. Indeed, the highest instances preferably select appeals filed by defendants (i.e. judgments
in favor of plaintiffs in appellate courts) and uphold appellate courts’ decisions, while often
declaring as “non-eligible” the appeals filed by plaintiffs (i.e. judgments in favor of defendants
in appellate courts). Hence, supreme instances essentially select cases in order to uphold appel-
late courts’ decisions and the correction activity does not alter the outcome of the trial. From a
legal viewpoint, the correction activity has “no influence” on final decisions.
• Scenario 2. With the second strategy, the correction activity has a decisive effect on the trial
outcome. Supreme instances preferably select appeals filed by plaintiffs (i.e. judgments in favor
of defendants in appellate courts) and reverse appellate courts’ decisions, while often declaring
as “non-eligible” the appeals filed by defendants (i.e. judgments in favor of plaintiffs in appel-
late courts). As a consequence, appellate courts’ decisions are reversed more often in favor of
plaintiffs. From a legal viewpoint, the correction activity modifies the trial outcome in favor of
plaintiffs.
In order to determine the selection process of supreme instances, we observe the influence of the
reforms in the Conseil d’État and the Cour de Cassation over their decisions to reverse appellate
courts’ decisions. For this purpose, we build a dummy variable (Reverse), taking value 1 when
the appellate court’s decision has been reversed and 0 otherwise. We carry out a Biprobit re-
gression with the dependent variables Reverse and Prodef. Indeed, whatever the selection mode
(Scenario 1 or Scenario 2), the decision to reverse or uphold a judgment is clearly correlated with
the identity of the winning party. We also introduce an interaction variable (Defappeal*Reform)
allowing us to observe the effect of a defendant appealing after the reform on the probability of
a judgment reversal. Last, we keep the whole set of previous control variables. Table 6 depicts
the results of the regression.
In order to capture the selection strategy of supreme instances, we focus on the variable Reverse.
In each court, the reform significantly increased the chances of a reversal decision. Hence, it
seems that the supreme courts often select cases in order to counter appellate courts’ decisions.
Besides, the interaction variable Defendant appeal*Reform has a significant and negative effect on
reversals. In other words, it seems that the supreme courts select cases in order to counter appel-
late courts’ decisions, particularly when the latter are unfavorable to the plaintiffs: defendants
have fewer chances of obtaining a reversal after the reform, though the overall chances of a re-
versal have increased. The selection bias thus clearly affects the overall trial outcome: courts
more often select cases that they will counter in favor of plaintiffs (Scenario 2).
These results suggest an overall interpretation concerning the impact of the correction activity
over the win rates of the litigants. A losing plaintiff (resp. defendant) in appellate courts has
relatively more chances than a defendant (resp. fewer chances than a plaintiff) of seeing her case
admitted by supreme instances and of obtaining a reversal of the appellate courts’ decision. In
other words, the pro-plaintiff effect observed when analyzing supreme courts is not a simple
statistical artefact giving a truncated description of the whole set of courts’ decisions. It is a
genuine bias which modifies the actual win rates of litigants in favor of plaintiffs.
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Table 6: Results of the Biprobit regression on Reverse and Pro-defendant
Coefficients
Reverse Pro-defendant
Reform in CE 0.485** -0.825***
(0.245) (0.258)
Reform in CC 0.403** -0.573***
(0.193) (0.200)
Def appeal*Reform -0.769*** 0.279
(0.245) (0.256)
Defendant appeal -0.276* -1.194***
(0.145) (0.149)
Athrho 0.227***
(0.072)
Controls Yes
Observations 614
Note. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have adopted two different approaches (linear regressions and matching esti-
mation) in order to distinguish and quantify the effects of bias correction activities and selection
biases of France’s two supreme courts. Our study shows that both the supreme administrative
and civil courts correct appellate courts’ decisions in the same direction and in the same mag-
nitude: both supreme courts are indeed more favorable towards plaintiffs than their respective
appellate courts. We have also shown that the correction activities of the supreme courts are
similar when both have the same selection mechanism over their dockets, i.e. administrative
judges’ decisions are not perceived by judges from the Conseil d’Etat as more biased than civil
judges’ decisions by judges from the Cour de Cassation. Finally, we find that this result is driven
by the selection strategies of the supreme courts, which are more likely to select cases that they
will overrule in favor of the plaintiffs. Indeed, our last results show that the supreme courts se-
lect cases in order to counter appellate courts’ decisions (i.e., increased probability of reversal),
particularly when the latter are unfavorable to the plaintiffs.
Our results have several implications for the public and academic debates on the role of supreme
courts. First, one can observe that both courts engage in the same level of correction activity and
that the correction goes in the same direction (pro-plaintiff correction). This result implies that
both branches of the French legal system are similar in terms of the relative biases between
supreme courts and their respective appellate courts, i.e. administrative judges from appellate
courts do not seem to be subject to any specific pro-defendant bias. In both branches, plaintiffs
face the same incentives to bring their claim to the highest court. Second, as far as the selection
mechanism is concerned, we observe that preventing courts from selecting cases puts great pres-
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sure on them. Indeed, the great increase in the probability of a pro-plaintiff decision resulting
from the selection rule shows the readiness of the courts to select cases and fully exercize their
correction activities. Regarding the harmonization of the legal system, giving supreme courts
control over their dockets might improve legal efficiency: their effective correction activity sends
signals to appellate courts. This finding is especially important in the perspective of judicial re-
forms undertaken in other countries. Indeed, some supreme courts have recently experienced
similar changes (Taiwan in the early 2000s,34 Brazil in 2007) and could be followed by others
since the backlog of cases before the courts and the resulting delays are a wide-spread public
policy problem.
Our investigation is nevertheless limited in several ways. An obvious limitation concerns case
selection: cases, which are brought by litigants to supreme courts, might not be representative
of the entire set of cases dealt with by appellate courts. We therefore ignore whether supreme
courts determine representative cases or exceptional ones. Investigating the entire set of cases
brought to lower or appeal courts could help understanding the relevance of the Supreme
Courts’ decisions. However, the investigation of the comprehensive set of decisions is, to our
knowledge, limited in France by the availability of data. Second, still regarding the appeal pro-
cess, it might be that the unobservable variables influencing the decision to bring the case to the
supreme court are correlated with the unobservable variables influencing the supreme courts’
decisions. Ignoring the correlation between these two decisions may lead to a flawed estima-
tion of the covariance matrix of our estimated coefficients, leading to “mistaken” inferences. A
remedy could be to consider the entire set of cases that were appealed to the Supreme Court
to understand the selection mechanism and to correct the subsequent inferences. Third, we are
limited in investigating the impact of the reform on supreme courts’ behaviors: we do not have
the pool of cases which have been denied any hearing by the supreme courts. Here again, unob-
served factors leading supreme courts to hear a case are very likely to explain their final decision.
Changes in strategies of litigants to bring their case to the supreme court, or anticipation by Ap-
peal Courts of the new institutional framework, are two main elements future research should
seek to take into account. Here again, a solution would consist in considering all appeal courts’
decision to determine litigants’ strategies and the associated changes following the reform.
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Tables
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics
Variables
All CE CC
p-value
Decisions only only
Defendant appeal 0.635 0.730 0.607 0.007
Compliance 0.539 0.489 0.554 0.177
Compensation 0.158 0.149 0.161 0.737
Proof 0.264 0.319 0.247 0.089
Causality 0.220 0.191 0.228 0.354
Uncertainty 0.153 0.128 0.161 0.339
Procedure 0.339 0.284 0.355 0.115
Water 0.350 0.369 0.345 0.598
Soil 0.171 0.163 0.173 0.777
Air 0.138 0.170 0.129 0.213
Sea 0.034 0.007 0.042 0.044
Noise 0.226 0.191 0.270 0.256
Note: The p-values correspond to two-sample proportion tests.
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Table 8: Full results of the Probit regressions
Full Period Before 1989 From 1989 to 2001 After 2001 Full Period Full Period
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
Conseil d’État (CE) -0.274* -0.152 -0.720*** -0.312
(0.147) (0.258) (0.272) (0.351)
CE×1t<1989 -0.0595
(0.234)
CE×11989≤t≤2001 -0.725*** -0.724***
(0.268) (0.268)
CE×12001>t -0.193
(0.337)
CE×(1− 11989≤t≤2001) -0.104
(0.191)
Defendant appeal -1.073*** -0.536** -1.517*** -0.868*** -1.077*** -1.077***
(0.122) (0.249) (0.200) (0.239) (0.123) (0.123)
Compliance 0.683*** 1.361*** 0.527** 0.732** 0.759*** 0.758***
(0.145) (0.336) (0.227) (0.295) (0.150) (0.150)
Compensation 0.580* 4.336*** -0.0795 -0.153 0.530 0.529
(0.319) (0.515) (0.473) (0.737) (0.325) (0.325)
Proof 0.0360 3.784*** -0.644 -0.602 0.00854 0.00449
(0.325) (0.496) (0.518) (0.696) (0.327) (0.327)
Causality -0.00153 -0.402 -0.0944 -0.162 -0.0261 -0.0282
(0.180) (0.391) (0.272) (0.372) (0.179) (0.179)
Uncertainty 0.487 3.939*** 0.0515 -0.178 0.424 0.422
(0.317) (0.594) (0.440) (0.733) (0.325) (0.324)
Procedure 0.454 4.257*** -0.0220 -0.335 0.400 0.398
(0.305) (0.487) (0.450) (0.720) (0.311) (0.311)
Water -0.0900 0.294 -0.132 -0.213 -0.171 -0.162
(0.200) (0.513) (0.325) (0.364) (0.209) (0.208)
Soil -0.442** -0.353 -0.205 -0.735** -0.429* -0.419*
(0.213) (0.582) (0.369) (0.357) (0.221) (0.217)
Air -0.636*** 0.0602 -0.571 -0.904** -0.650*** -0.641***
(0.230) (0.638) (0.355) (0.395) (0.236) (0.234)
Sea -0.362 0.0654 -0.426 -0.165 -0.152
(0.390) (0.745) (0.470) (0.402) (0.403)
Noise -0.134 0.138 -0.192 -0.408 -0.236 -0.224
(0.210) (0.540) (0.329) (0.397) (0.218) (0.213)
Constant -0.212 -4.734*** 0.802 0.287 -0.101 -0.0901
(0.351) (0.571) (0.506) (0.741) (0.369) (0.367)
Period FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 614 168 276 169 614 614
Nagelkerke R2 0.395 0.432 0.466 0.342 0.395 0.395
Cox Snell R2 0.272 0.309 0.345 0.240 0.287 0.287
Note. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 9: Results of the Biprobit regression on Reverse and Pro-defendant
Reverse Pro-defendant
Reform in CE 0.485** -0.825***
(0.245) (0.258)
Reform in CC 0.403** -0.573***
(0.193) (0.200)
Def appeal*Reform -0.769*** 0.279
(0.245) (0.256)
Defendant appeal -0.276* -1.194***
(0.145) (0.149)
Compliance 0.132 0.791***
(0.139) (0.149)
Compensation 0.528 0.488
(0.337) (0.357)
Proof 0.609* -0.049
(0.328) (0.357)
Causality -0.047 -0.042
(0.183) (0.186)
Uncertainty -0.219 0.418
(0.340) (0.360)
Procedure 0.524 0.360
(0.323) (0.346)
Water -0.202 -0.174
(0.187) (198)
Soil -0.205 -0.435**
(0.197) (0.212)
Air -0.528** -0.617***
(0.225) (0.238)
Sea -0.101 -0.161
(0.343) (0.361)
Noise -0.442** -0.234
(0.206) (0.211)
Constant -0.739** -0.001
(0.341) (0.357)
Athrho 0.227***
(0.071)
Observations 614
Log-likelihood -615.46
Wald χ2 208.89
Rho 0.230
(0.068)
Note. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Appendix A.
Table 10 presents the results of a regression in which two interaction variables have been added
(Column 3): a variable representing cases determined in the Conseil d’État (supreme administra-
tive tribunal, CE) after the 1987 reform and a variable representing cases determined in the Cour
de Cassation (supreme civil court) after the 2001 reform.
Comparing the results of this regression with those of the regression without these interaction
variables (Column 2), we observe that the variable Conseil d’État loses significance when taking
reforms into account. This confirms the analysis conducted with separate regressions (Table 8).
The regression without interaction variables suggests a pro-plaintiff bias in the Conseil d’État.
This effect is indeed related to an earlier introduction of the reform in this court w.r.t. the Cour
de Cassation. This effect is linked to a selection bias by courts, which remains hidden when one
ignores the reforms allowing the supreme courts to have control over their dockets.
Moreover, when comparing the coefficients of the two interaction variables using a Wald test, we
see that these two variables have a similar effect. Indeed, under the null hypothesis of equal co-
efficients, we obtain a χ2 value of 0.66 with a p− value of 0.4158. We thus accept the assumption
that the reform has a pro-plaintiff effect of the same magnitude in the two courts.
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Table 10: Probit regression with and without interaction variables
Without interaction variables With interaction variables
Selection bias not taken into account Selection bias taken into account
Conseil d’État (CE) -0.274* 0.129
(0.147) (0.201)
CE after Reform only - -0.547**
(0.273)
CC after Reform only - - 0.455***
(0.158)
Defendant appeal -1.073*** -1.081***
(0.121) (0.123)
Compliance 0.683*** 0.768***
(0.145) (0.149)
Compensation 0.580* 0.533
(0.319) (0.355)
Proof 0.036 0.003***
(0.352) (0.354)
Causality -0.00153 -0.035
(0.183) (0.187)
Uncertainty 0.487 0.432
(0.357) (0.358)
Procedure 0.454 0.401
(0.343) (0.343)
Water -0.090 -0.172
(0.200) (0.197)
Soil -0.442** -0.427**
(0.213) (0.212)
Air -0.636*** -0.643***
(0.230) (0.239)
Sea -0.362 -0.166
(0.390) (0.367)
Noise -0.134 -0.235
(0.210) (0.211)
Constant -0.212 -0.032
(0.351) (0.354)
Observations 614 614
LR test 195.243 207.365
Nagelkerke R2 0.395 0.394
Cox Snell R2 0.272 0.287
C-stat (%) 76.71 76.87
Note. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Figure 2: French legal framework
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